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ISSUE 1J ANUARY/FEBRUARY 1998
s URPRISING STRENGTH IN the national economy and the 
energy sector eclipsed any weaknesses in the Texas economy,
leading to another year of vigorous growth for the state. Texas
gross state product grew at a robust 7.4 percent annual rate in
the first half of 1997, despite labor market tightness and slower
growth in high-tech manufacturing and exports to Mexico. 
Energy sector expansion and a pickup in national demand fed strong
growth in the construction, financial, business services and distribu-
tion sectors.
National Economic Growth Spurred Texas’ Growth
The strength of the U.S. economy was a surprise to many. At the
end of 1996, the consensus among analysts was 2.2 percent growth
in 1997.
1 In contrast, GDP growth through the third quarter averaged







The Asian MeltdownTexas employment grew at a 3.6 per-
cent annual rate in 1997, quite a bit bet-
ter than the nation’s 2.4 percent growth
over the same period (Chart 1).
2 Texas’
employment growth was fairly broad-
based. In 1997, all private sectors grew
above trend; Chart 2 shows the dif-
ference between 1997 employment
growth and the average rate of growth
in the 1990s for each sector.
Energy Sector Boosted 1997 Growth
The energy sector, one of the hottest
sectors in 1997, helped to push Texas’
growth rate ahead of the nation’s. Rela-
tively high oil and natural gas prices
over the past year led to increased 
activity in the oil fields. Employment in
oil and gas extraction increased at a 
5.4 percent annual rate in 1997, the best
growth since 1990.
The health of the energy industry has
always been closely linked to strong 
oil prices. Although this still holds, im-
provements in technology have changed
the definition of “strong oil prices” in
recent years. New technologies such as
three-dimensional seismic imaging have
lowered costs of exploration and devel-
opment while expanding possibilities
for new fields once deemed too risky 
to explore. In fact, oil companies have
seen their costs halved in the past 10
years, making it possible for companies
to earn profits at much lower oil prices
than in the past. With oil prices averag-
ing near $21 per barrel, the oil industry
did very well in 1997 (see page 7,
“Houston Heats Up”).
Not Much Upward Risk for Oil Prices
After spending much of the year in
the lofty $20+ range, oil prices fell to
near $18 per barrel in December, the
lowest price since the end of 1995. Warm
weather, the easing of tensions with
Iraq and larger OPEC quotas all exerted
downward pressure on oil prices. At
their November meeting, OPEC decided
to increase production quotas, which
had been unchanged since 1993, from
25 million to 27.5 million barrels per
day. However, it is doubtful the quota
increase will greatly affect oil prices be-
cause OPEC members had been over-
producing quotas, with OPEC production
near 28 million barrels per day in 
August  1997. In December, the Iraqi 
government and the United Nations
reached an agreement about Iraqi oil
sales. Additions of Iraqi oil to the mar-
ket will put further downward pressure
on prices. Another factor that weakened
prices was the relatively warm Decem-
ber weather, due to El Niño, which may
continue for the whole heating season.
All in all, a price of $18–$19 per barrel
would be a safe bet for West Texas 
Intermediate crude in 1998. The futures
market is currently saying much the
same, predicting prices under $19 per
barrel for the next several years.
Construction Followed Suit
The construction sector was another
bright spot in 1997. Since the banner
year of 1994, analysts have been sur-
prised year after year by better-than-
expected levels of construction sector
activity. 1997 was no exception.
The industrial and office markets
continued to be strong, as Chart 3 illus-
trates. High levels of absorption in the
industrial market quelled analysts’ mid-
year fears of overbuilding. Office markets
across the state showed improvement.
The office market was especially robust
in the Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex, with
higher rents and lower vacancy rates. In
Page  2 Southwest Economy   January/February 1998 
Chart 1

















1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Chart 2
Growth Was Broad-Based 
in 1997

















* Transportation, communications and public utilities.
** Finance, insurance and real estate.
Chart 3
The Construction Sector
Continued Its Strong Rate 
of Growth in 1997
Construction Contract Values













1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990Houston, the office market improved so
much that plans were announced for
the first new office tower downtown
since 1986. Austin and San Antonio 
office markets also saw increasing occu-
pancy rates in 1997.
The housing market was healthy as
well. In 1997, residential contract values
neared their 1996 peak. Single-family
permits, although still very high, came
down from their 1996 highs (Chart 4).
Annual housing-price movements through
the third quarter of 1997 were mixed.
Median new home prices fell because
of increased sales of lower-priced starter
homes. Median existing home prices
rose between 6 percent and 9 percent
in Austin, Dallas and Houston. For the
state as a whole, the House Price Index,
an index of same-home repeat sales,
shows that Texas existing home prices
grew 3.2 percent. Contacts reported
hectic demand in the existing home
market in the last part of 1997 and ex-
pect strong growth in the single-family
sector at least until the end of 1999.
Total Exports Surged Despite Slower
Growth in Mexican Exports
Mexico is Texas’ biggest trading part-
ner, receiving roughly 40 percent of
Texas exports. Chart 5 shows that Texas
export growth to Mexico slowed to a 6
percent annual rate in the first half of
1997, quite a bit below the 14 percent
average growth seen since 1987. None-
theless, South Texas saw strong growth
in the trade and service sectors as a 
result of Mexico’s continued recovery
(see page 6, “Strong Economic Activity
in Austin and San Antonio” and “Stead-
ier Growth Ahead for El Paso”). Vig-
orous growth in exports to other 
nations, such as Canada and Singapore,
caused total Texas export growth to
pick up speed in ’97, with an annual-
ized 12 percent increase in the first half
of the year, compared with 7 percent
growth in ’96.
Real Mexican GDP grew 7 percent
through the third quarter of 1997. The
Dallas Fed’s leading index for Mexico
suggests continued growth but no fire-
works (Chart 6 ). Most economists expect
a deceleration of the Mexican economy
to about 5 percent growth in 1998.
Distribution Sector Expanded
The distribution sector reflected the
strength of the Texas and NAFTA
economies in 1997. Transportation sec-
tor employment grew at a 5.3 percent
annual rate last year, with trucking and
warehousing growing by 6.1 percent
(see page 6, “D/FW Metroplex Leads the
State”).
The extraordinary levels of business
activity in the state also contributed to
Union Pacific rail bottlenecks. Rail ship-
ping delays caused headaches for 
manufacturers of chemicals, steel, autos,
lumber, cement and brick. Chemical
firms reported production cuts as a re-
sult of the slow return of their railcars,
which double as storage containers for
some products. In addition, shipping
delays caused grain crops to spoil, hurt-
ing farmers and agricultural lenders (see
page 7, “Slower Growth Outside Major
Metropolitan Texas”).
Many contacts reported using alter-
native shipping methods, such as truck
and air, but at as much as triple the rail
shipment cost. Truck and air cargo ship-
ments going through Laredo jumped by
a third, relative to rail shipments, from
August to October. However, competi-
tion in the product markets prevented
companies from passing the higher
shipping costs through to selling prices.
Although the distribution sector may
see its expansion tempered by slower
growth in the U.S. economy, it should




Chart 7 shows that overall high-tech
manufacturing growth slowed in 1997.
Nevertheless, the services side of high-
tech saw very strong employment
growth. Software companies and com-
puter-related services are all part of the
business services sector, which surged
an annualized 12.5 percent in 1997.
The Dallas Fed’s December Beige
Book reported that growth in sales of
electronic components, telecommunica-
tions equipment and semiconductors
slowed because concerns about weak
Asian demand caused customers to trim
inventories. Contacts also reported con-
cerns that weak Asian currencies will
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Chart 6
The Mexican Leading Index
Suggests Continued Growth




















GDP growthput downward pressure on semicon-
ductor and component prices.
Given the Southeast Asian uncer-
tainty and the weakening in national
demand expected in ’98, high-tech manu-
facturing employment growth is expected
to be sluggish for another year. High-
tech services are less vulnerable to the
Southeast Asian problems but may also
see slightly slower—though still robust
—growth, should national demand slow.
Labor Market Tightness Continued
Throughout 1997 and Does Not
Show Signs of Easing
The Dallas Fed Beige Book reported
labor market tightness throughout 1997,
for both low- and high-skilled workers.
Despite last year’s strong employment
growth, it is possible that labor market
tightness constrained expansion nonethe-
less. Chart 8 shows that unemployment
rates fell further in 1997, especially in
nonborder areas where rates remain
below the U.S. average. Furthermore,
the state seems to be getting less relief
from domestic migration than in the past.
Seven percent fewer people migrated to
Texas in 1997. Of the 150,000 migrants,
two-thirds were international. If the na-
tional economy continues to be healthy,
no increase in migration is expected.
The labor market was especially tight
in the high-tech and energy industries.
Many high-tech companies in the re-
gion report hundreds of high-tech jobs
are going vacant for lack of skilled
workers. Austin companies recruited
nationwide, traveling as far as Boston to
recruit software engineers.
3 Some com-
panies hired outside the United States,
while still others recruited next door,
luring away workers from competitors
by offering recruiting bonuses to tech-
nicians and factory workers. Top soft-
ware engineer salaries soared by as
much as $20,000 in one year, with the
typical increase being $7,000–$10,000.
4
In the energy industry, companies went
to England to recruit machinists and to
India to hire welders. Geologists and
petroleum engineers were in high de-
mand, with reports of $50,000 three-
year retention bonuses.
Labor market tightness did not trans-
late into higher Texas wages. Manufac-
turing wage growth slowed to 1.7
percent in 1997 from 2.3 percent in 1996.
One reason may be that the bonuses
and stock options that employees re-
ceive are not reflected in the wage data.
Personal income data (which would 
reflect some of these nonwage pay-
ments) grew quite a bit faster at 7.6 
percent in 1997, while 1996 growth was
6.5 percent.
In response to worker shortages,
many companies, besides stepping up
recruitment programs, are also taking a
more active role in training future work-
ers. To increase the supply of engi-
neers, a number of telecommunications
companies such as Motorola, South-
western Bell Communications Technol-
ogy Resources Inc., AT&T and Texas
Instruments have joined forces with UT
Austin, Texas A&M, Texas Tech and UT
Dallas to form the Texas Telecommuni-
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Despite a bout 
with the “Asian flu,”
Texas should continue
to see fairly robust
growth in 1998, 
albeit somewhat
slower than in 1997.
Chart 7
High-Tech Manufacturing
Employment Growth Was Flat






























Texas nonbordercations Consortium (TxTEC).
5 TxTEC
will support research and educational
programs in leading-edge technology.
Such training programs may help allevi-
ate some of the hiring problems, as
could slower growth in the national
economy. However, with a continued
slowdown in migration to the state, the
labor market tightness is not expected
to unwind much next year.
Southeast Asia Is a Downside Risk
The turmoil in Southeast Asia and
the extent to which it will affect Texas
is a significant cloud on the horizon.
Chart 9 shows the growth of real Texas
exports. In the second quarter of 1997,
Texas sent only 16 percent of its total
exports to the PACNIC countries (Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan, China and Hong
Kong) and Japan. This is somewhat less
than the 23 percent share for the nation
(Chart 10). These countries together 
accounted for about 7 percent of the
growth in Texas exports last year.
From an export perspective, the
Texas industries most vulnerable to a
downturn in Southeast Asia are chemi-
cals, electronic machinery, industrial
machinery and agriculture. In Decem-
ber, contacts reported expectations that
weak Asian currencies would put down-
ward pressure on semiconductor and
component prices, and sales and profits
would be hurt in the first quarter of ’98
as demand from Asian countries de-
clines. Companies that manufacture
products in the United States to sell in
Southeast Asia might be hurt the most
in the short run. If the problems result
in a decline in capital expenditures in
Asia, capacity growth in that region will
slow and U.S. manufacturers may bene-
fit in the long run through increased
market share.
Petrochemical producers were also
concerned about declining demand in
Asian markets and increases in Asian
exports to the U.S. market. The auster-
ity measures imposed by the World
Bank require the cancellation of several
petrochemical projects in Southeast Asia,
which has already adversely affected
some Texas engineering firms. In the
long run though, this could mean
greater market share for Texas petro-
chemical producers.
Texas Economic Growth Should Be
Somewhat Slower in 1998
The Texas economy should continue
to grow at a relatively strong but some-
what slower rate than in 1997—around
3 percent in 1998. The main factors for
slower growth are a slower national
economy, a slower Mexican economy,
lower oil prices and labor market tight-
ness. The turmoil in Southeast Asia is a
downside risk to this forecast.
In contrast to near 4 percent growth
in 1997, the U.S. economy is expected
to grow 2 percent to 2.5 percent in 1998.
This slower growth will give less of a lift
to the Texas economy in 1998. Simi-
larly, the Mexican economy is also ex-
pected to grow at a slower rate than it
did this year. Thus, the growth in Texas’
exports to Mexico should not increase
much.
Barring political problems in the
Middle East, the risk to oil prices is only
on the downside. The growth rate of
the oil and gas extraction industry
should be somewhat less than 1997’s.
Labor market tightness is expected to
continue into 1998, especially in the
high-tech and energy sectors. If the 
national economy slows, it will help 
alleviate some of the labor market prob-
lems, but only slightly.
Although it is too early to tell how
the Southeast Asian turmoil will play out,
the region may be adversely affected in
the short run. Despite a bout with the
“Asian flu,” Texas should continue to
see fairly robust growth in 1998, albeit




1 Blue Chip consensus forecast at year-end 1996.
2 All 1997 employment numbers are annualized rates over the first 
10 months of the year.
3 See Janin Friend, “Guerrilla Recruiting,” Texas Business, November/
December 1997.
4 For more detailed information on the growth of Texas’ high-tech 
industry, see D’Ann M. Petersen and Michelle Burchfiel, “Silicon
Prairie, How High Tech Is Redefining Texas’ Economy,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, Issue 3, 1997.
5 For more on this collaboration, see Bridget Metzger, “Technotalent,
Higher Education Joins Industry to Collaborate on the Future of 
the Telecommunications Industry in Texas,” Texas Business, Novem-
ber/December 1997.
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Texas United StatesStrong Economic Activity in Austin and San Antonio
Austin experienced continued healthy growth in 1997, al-
though job gains were only about half the very robust pace of
1992–95. A rebound in the semiconductor industry was a
leading contributor to growth in Austin last year. Overall,
manufacturing employment grew 4.2 percent, which was
more than twice the state average.
The San Antonio economy grew at a strong pace in 1997
after slowing in 1995 and 1996. The improvement in growth
was concentrated in the trade and service sectors. A main
factor behind the strength was a rebound in the
purchasing power of Mexican nationals as a
greater percentage of the population
began to feel the recovery in Mexico.
Also stimulating growth was strength
in the telecommunications and in-
surance industries.
In 1998, economic activity in
Austin and San Antonio should
continue to grow briskly, al-
though the rate is likely to
slow. San Antonio should
continue to benefit from the
expanding Mexican economy,
but growth in Mexico should
moderate from the very fast
pace of 1997. Also, increases in
the rapidly growing service sec-
tor in San Antonio will likely be
offset somewhat by job declines at
Kelly Air Force Base. And although
Asian demand for high-tech products is
expected to decline in 1998, most Austin high-
tech manufacturers should continue to benefit from
strong demand in the United States, Europe and Latin America.
—Keith R. Phillips
D/FW Metroplex Leads the State
After accelerating forcefully in 1996, the Dallas/Fort Worth
economic powerhouse coasted into high gear in 1997, cool-
ing slightly but ending the year with very strong job growth.
High-tech manufacturing and a growing distribution hub con-
tinue to drive the metroplex economy, stimulating construc-
tion, business services and wholesale and retail trade. After
increasing 5.1 percent in 1996, employment rose an estimated
4.7 percent in the D/FW metroplex in 1997, adding more jobs
than any other region of the state.
Texas is the nation’s second largest high-tech employer,
and the D/FW metroplex is home for over half of those work-
ers. D/FW manufacturing employment increased strongly in
1997, rising nearly 3 percent. Expansion of high-tech and
other manufacturers stimulated demand for retail and business
services, such as legal, accounting and temporary workers.
Job growth in the service sector was robust in 1997, although
slightly slower than in 1996. This growth was constrained per-
haps by hiring difficulties, as there were widespread reports
that employers were having problems finding workers.
New or expanding companies often cite a favorable busi-
ness climate, low cost of living and sound higher education
system as reasons for locating in Texas. A solid
transportation infrastructure is also an impor-
tant reason firms choose the D/FW area.
In the center of North America, D/FW
is a focal point of road, rail and air
connections to the world. From the
metroplex, distributors can ship to
anywhere in the United States
within 48 hours. Continuing ex-
pansion of D/FW’s distribu-
tion and warehousing facilities
stimulated job growth and con-
tinued to attract new manufac-
turers in 1997. The Fort Worth
area saw particularly brisk ex-
pansion in transportation and
manufacturing, and the strong
employment gains in these indus-
tries pushed the area’s job growth
above the year-earlier rate.
Expansion of the metroplex econ-
omy should continue into the next century,
although job growth is likely to cool further in
1998. The D/FW economy will likely be affected by
weaker demand for goods and services from slower U.S. and
Asian markets, as well as by competition from cheaper Asian
imports. Still the area’s expansion should continue and will be
boosted by construction of a $1.3 billion semiconductor fac-
tory that is planned for Fort Worth.
—Fiona Sigalla
Steadier Growth Ahead for El Paso
El Paso should post stable employment growth in 1998, led
by gains in construction and both wholesale and retail trade.
More widespread growth in Mexico’s economy will translate
into a steadier inflow of Mexican shoppers to border retail
outlets in 1998. The city’s manufacturing industry, by contrast,
will continue to witness more of the structural change that has













1997 Employment Sharescharacterized it for much of the past several years. The apparel
industry, El Paso’s traditional manufacturing niche that em-
ploys over 42 percent of the city’s workers in this sector, has
been on a steady decline. However, supplier industries that
cater to the dynamic maquiladora market across the border—
plastic-injection molding, metal stamping, and electronic and
automotive components—have emerged as new and consis-
tent sources of manufacturing jobs. Nevertheless, unskilled
workers displaced by the apparel industry cannot be immedi-
ately absorbed by these higher skilled jobs, creating a labor-
mismatch dilemma for El Paso and placing the spotlight on
the city’s insufficient infrastructure of vocational training and
retraining programs. Funding for such programs, however, is
steadily becoming available to the city through local, state and
federal sources. Therefore, the city should be better able to
absorb higher skilled manufacturing industries in the future,
especially those that will relocate and/or expand in El Paso to
supply their growing maquiladora customers across the border.
—Lucinda Vargas
Houston Heats Up
Houston had a banner year in 1997, following a good one
in 1996. Once all the data are collected and revised, they will
show Houston job growth was near 5 percent between De-
cember 1996 and December 1997, the city’s best performance
since 1990. Strong employment gains and a tight labor market
pulled the local unemployment rate to 4.5 percent late in
1997.
It was not just employment that provided good economic
news for Houston in 1997. New home sales, housing starts
and existing home sales were up at double-digit rates over
those of 1996; Harris County automobile sales ran at record
levels; and occupancy rose sharply in the Houston office mar-
ket, with notable gains downtown. The Houston Purchasing
Managers Index averaged 61.6 in 1997, indicating vigorous
sales, high rates of production and growing lead times in the
local manufacturing sector.
The key factors driving local growth in 1997 were an ac-
celerating U.S. economy and expansion in oil exploration,
drilling and production. The positive turnaround in drilling
and oil services was dramatic, as the Baker Hughes rig count
moved over 1,000 for the first time since 1990–91. High levels
of drilling activity were driven by two years of oil prices that
averaged over $20 per barrel and natural gas prices that aver-
aged over $2 per thousand cubic feet. No city is better poised
to take advantage of a surge in oil field activity, with 65,000
local jobs tied to oil and oil-related machinery industries. For
Houston, it brought two years of strong growth in oil services,
durable manufacturing and business services.
Look for another good year in Houston in 1998. Tight labor
markets and shortages of oil-related equipment and skills will
prevent a repeat of 1997’s 5 percent job gain. But fundamen-
tals should remain positive in oil markets unless oil prices slip
under $17 per barrel for an extended period.
—Robert W. Gilmer
Slower Growth Outside Major Metropolitan Texas
Economic activity outside Texas’ major metropolitan areas
continued to expand in 1997, although nonagricultural 
employment growth slowed from 3 percent in 1996 to an 
estimated 1.7 percent in 1997. High energy prices and re-
bounding retail trade in South Texas stimulated economic 
activity, but agricultural communities were still feeling the 
effects of the 1996 drought and changes in farm subsidies.
Nearly a third of Texas’ nonagricultural employment is outside
the major metro areas. Consequently, although the area’s em-
ployment growth rate slowed in 1997, this portion of the state
was still the third-largest source of new jobs in Texas, follow-
ing Dallas and Houston.
A thriving energy industry provided strong stimulus to
Texas in 1997, and the benefits of increased drilling and ex-
ploration were felt across the state. High oil prices and new
technologies spurred exploration in parts of Texas that have
seen little activity since the oil bust of 1982. Employment
growth was particularly strong—up 4.2 percent in Midland
and Odessa, where economic activity has been solid for a
number of years.
A rebounding Mexican economy spurred retail sales and
other economic activity along the Texas–Mexico border in
1997. Border towns such as Laredo, Brownsville and McAllen
are retail centers serving South Texas and northern Mexico.
Retail sales and economic activity had dropped sharply in
these cities following the peso devaluation and Mexican re-
cession that began in late 1994. Mexico’s economy continued
to recover and expand in 1997, and border cities benefited
from the increase in purchasing power of Mexican nationals.
In 1997, employment increased 8 percent in Laredo, 6 percent
in McAllen and 4 percent in Brownsville.
Cities supporting Texas’ agricultural economy added fewer
nonagricultural jobs in 1997 than in 1996. Texas farm and
ranch income is expected to be up in 1997, following drought
and low cattle prices in 1996. Higher calf prices and a large
supply of feeder calves helped boost the state’s cattle feeding
industry and provide a large market for Texas grain. Although
many crop prices were lower in 1997 than in 1996, favorable
weather conditions stimulated production after some planting
delays in the spring. Texas cotton farmers harvested a million
bales more in 1997, from fewer acres, than in 1996. Record
corn and peanut production is expected. Declining govern-
ment payments and increased planting flexibility, however,
continue to push a restructuring of the farm sector that is
likely to continue for several years. Some producers—most
notably dairy and rice farms—discontinued operations in
1997. Although the Texas agricultural industry remains strong,
the restructuring will affect the growth rates of agricultural
communities.
—Fiona Sigalla
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and the president signed, a bud-
get agreement that made sub-
stantive changes to the existing
tax code. With this agreement,
both Congress and the White
House have promised to achieve bud-
get balance by the year 2002. To the
dismay of many, deficits have been a
continuing feature of federal budget
policy for several decades (Chart 1).
History tells a troubling story. In the 30
years following World War II, the deficit
averaged just $6.6 billion annually. This
era included two major wars—Korea
and Vietnam—events that have histori-
cally generated large deficits. But in the
post–Vietnam War era, the deficit mush-
roomed to an average of $183 billion
annually, causing many observers both
to ask why and to wonder how and
when the nation could again achieve
fiscal balance.
1
After peaking in 1992, recent deficits
have fallen so rapidly that there is talk
of budget balance even sooner than the
predicted balance in 2002. This is very
good news for a nation that is used to
so much red ink and the steady buildup
of its national debt. Unfortunately, there
is already a good deal of talk about
spending monies that we do not, as yet,
have in the bank.
Before we begin “counting our
chickens,” it might be instructive to ex-
amine the historical fiscal record to see
what lessons can be learned from the
last 30 years of federal budget policy.
Perhaps by studying why the deficit first
expanded and why it has so stubbornly
persisted, we can identify the flaws in
our fiscal psychology that have led to a
$5 trillion run-up in our nation’s debt
since 1969.
This article examines the history of
federal deficits and investigates the
question of whether the 1997 budget
agreement should be counted on to
achieve its stated purpose.
Thirty Years of Deficits
Several factors have been blamed 
for the deficits of the past 30 years: un-
bridled expansion in federal entitlement
programs, overly generous tax cuts
(passed to reverse a severe recession in
1980–82), excessive defense spending
during the Reagan years and a bur-
geoning national health care bill. These
explanations, among others, have been
advanced to explain why federal cash
flows have repeatedly wound up in 
the red.
However, the central question that
underlies these explanations is really 
a simple one: Are taxes too low or is
spending too high? Whichever side one
chooses, the main message should not
be lost in the debate, namely, the bud-
get process has failed repeatedly to de-
liver on its central promise: to constrain
the nation to live within its means. In
order to see what has happened, it is 
instructive to review the past three
decades of federal budget policy.
As Chart 1 shows, deficits have been
an ongoing feature of the federal bud-
get since a small surplus last occurred
in 1969. Since 1992, the deficit has
fallen so rapidly that many in Washing-
ton are now speaking about budget 
surpluses in the near future and are 
already discussing what should be 
done with the extra revenue—either 
pay down the existing national debt 
or enlarge and/or add new spending
programs.
The historical picture is clear on one
point: expenditures have exceeded out-
lays since 1969 and will continue to 
exceed them at least through 1998. 
Additionally, expenditures have also 
exceeded both the Congress’s own rev-
enue projections and the growth in per
capita income of taxpayers.
2 The very
complex federal budget process seems
incapable of matching expenditures to
its own revenue estimates or, as average
taxpayers would express it, living
within its means (Chart 2).
3 Since Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) projec-
tions have tracked actual tax revenues
much more accurately than they have
outlays (Chart 3), the inevitable result
has been continuing deficits. Although
the commonly advanced explanations
all have some merit, they fail to explain
all the evidence. To understand why,
one has only to appreciate the vastly
differing economic and tax climates that
have, nonetheless, all produced exactly
the same thing: deficits.
Chart 4 shows that since 1970, fed-
eral outlays have been greater than 
collected tax revenues. Although the
1981–83 period shows a decline in tax
revenues collected, during all other
years federal tax revenues grew faster
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Chart 2
Actual and Projected Federal
Expenditures, 1976–2007












2,500than the incomes that produced them.
Over the past 30 years there have been
far more major tax increases than tax
cuts. Most people are familiar with the
largest of such increases—the 1983 Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
package, the 1986 Tax Reform package
and the 1990 budget deal between
then-President Bush and Congress. They
are also most likely aware of the in-
creases during the past five years, such
as the rise in marginal income tax rates
in 1993, the reimposition of the federal
aviation tax and the new telephone tax
designed to connect all schools to the
Internet. But there have been other
changes accompanied by large tax in-
creases about which the public is less
aware—specifically, the payroll tax in-
creases that began with rate and base
changes in 1973 and were amended 
in 1986. These changes resulted in one
of the largest tax increases in history
and have contributed to the record
growth of federal tax revenues during
this period.
The payroll tax increased 43 percent
between 1973 and 1997. The income
base to which payroll taxes apply has
risen 900 percent for Old Age Survivors
Disability Insurance assessments and an
incalculable amount for Health Insur-
ance (Medicare/Medicaid) due to the
elimination of an income cap for that
tax in 1993.
4 As the unemployment rate
falls—and it is the lowest now that it
has been in over 40 years—payroll tax
base collections grow as well. As a 
result, over 50 percent of American
workers pay more in Social Security/
Medicare taxes than they do in federal
income taxes. As Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan recently put
it in testimony before the House Budget
Committee, “The best economic perfor-
mance in decades has augmented tax
revenues far beyond expectations while
restraining countercyclically sensitive
outlays.”
5 In fact, workers today are
paying four times the payroll taxes they
paid in the 1960s.
The combined effect of rising tax
rates and a strong economic expansion
has been the catalyst by which we have
been able to approach budget balance.
In fact, 1996’s combined federal and
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  9
Chart 3
Actual and Projected 
Revenues and Actual Federal
Expenditures, 1976–2007
Billions of U.S. dollars
Projected
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(Vertical lines are years when large
tax increases were legislated.)
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
The combined effect 
of rising tax rates
and a strong economic
expansion has been 
the catalyst by which
we have been able 
to approach budget
balance.state/local tax bite as a percentage of
GDP stood at 33.2 percent (19.4 per-
cent federal and 13.8 percent state/
local) and represented an all-time high
for American taxpayers (Chart 5 ). These
historically high rates of taxation, com-
bined with strong economic perfor-
mance, have pushed the federal deficit
lower. Several factors other than tax rate
changes and a strong economy are also
responsible for rising tax collections:
the stock market boom, which has
pushed equity prices higher and re-
sulted in rising capital gains tax collec-
tions; low unemployment, which has
lowered spending and raised tax reve-
nues; and low inflation, which has re-
strained expenditures tied to automatic
cost-of-living adjustments. Low infla-
tion also has lowered the interest rate
structure, allowing federal debt to be 
financed more cheaply. Additionally, the
end of the Cold War has allowed large
real cuts in the defense establishment,
and the one-time sale of spectrum rights
by the Federal Communications Com-
mission added billions to the Treasury.
And as the savings and loan bailout
concluded, sales of former thrift assets
brought an additional $15 billion into
the federal Treasury.
Although these factors contributed to
narrowing the deficit, which has
cheered the stock and bond markets,
Chairman Greenspan sounded a note of
warning in his October 8 testimony:
Given the wider range of possible
outcomes that we face for long-term
economic growth, the corresponding
range of possible budget outcomes
over the next five to ten years has
widened appreciably. In addition to
the uncertainties associated with eco-
nomic outcomes, questions may be
raised about other assumptions be-
hind projected receipts and outlays.
With regard to the former, it is dif-
ficult to believe that our much higher-
than-expected income tax receipts of
late are unrelated to the huge increase
in capital gains [Chart 6 ] which, since
1995, have totaled the equivalent of
one-third of national income.
…[On] the outlay side, the recently
enacted budget agreement relies im-
portantly on significant, but as-yet-
unspecified, restraints on discretionary
spending to be made in the years
2001, 2002, and thereafter. Supporters
of each program expect the restraints
to fall elsewhere. (Emphasis added)
In other words, don’t count the chickens
just yet.
What Chairman Greenspan was al-
luding to was the optimistic nature of
the assumptions built into the projected
budget balance: that economic growth
will continue to be strong—with low
inflation and low unemployment rates
continuing; that unspecified cuts in
spending scheduled for 2000 and be-
yond will actually be made; that
Medicare spending will be reduced $135
billion over the next five years; and that
no unforeseen national emergency will
occur, requiring higher spending.
The 1997 Budget Deal
Numerous assumptions about the
economy’s performance and the gov-
ernment’s spending and revenue levels
are invariably incorporated into every
budget agreement. But the 1997 agree-
ment also amends the existing tax code
in many substantial ways. An additional
assumption is that these many tax code
changes will not negatively affect the
projections of revenues actually col-
lected over the next five years. How-
ever, considering the number of changes
in the 1997 law—there are 285 new
sections, and 824 modifications to exist-
ing tax law—tax revenue projections
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the interest rate
structure, allowing
federal debt to be 
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cheaply.are going to be, at best, educated
guesses. Congress’s Joint Tax Commit-
tee will soon release its “Blue Book” on
just these changes. Nonetheless, the
book is 549 pages long. These changes
include additional tax credits for chil-
dren, the raising of estate tax caps, re-
definitions of long- and short-term
capital gains, the addition of a new
form of Individual Retirement Account
(Roth IRA) and significant educational
tax credits and subsidies.
6
Given the extreme complexity of
these changes, it is unlikely that anyone
can predict how all this will play out in
terms of future tax collections. Any sig-
nificant change in overall economic
performance that might occur will only
further complicate the forecasting pic-
ture. It appears that counting our chick-
ens is a good deal harder to do than
most of us realize.
Explanations and Evidence
In examining the explanations for
the deficit record of the past 30 years,
we can see the strengths and weak-
nesses of the ones most commonly
proffered for budget red ink.
Tax Cuts Deprived the Federal
Government of Sufficient Revenues.
Although the top marginal income tax
rate was cut in 1982 from 77 percent to
28 percent and the capital gains rate
was cut from 28 percent to 20 percent,
this explanation fails to account for the
deficits between 1970 and 1983. Also, it
neither addresses the fact that federal
revenues have tripled since 1980 nor
explains how federal tax collections
could have soared in real terms (5.8
percent per year) between 1983 and
1989. This explanation further ignores
the significant tax increases of 1972–73,
1982, 1986, 1990 and 1993 (see the ver-
tical lines in Chart 4).
Defense Spending Caused the
Deficits. This explanation has a super-
ficial plausibility. During the Cold War,
we had deficits. Now that the Cold War
has ended, we seem to be on the way
toward a balanced budget. However,
the Cold War dates to 1946, and the
deficit problem only started after 1970.
Further, while it is true that defense
spending rose in real terms during the
early and mid-1980s (about 4.77 per-
cent per year from 1981 to 1988), it is
equally true that the increase occurred
during a strong economic downturn
that automatically pushed the deficit up
in the early years. This buildup was not
really very important for the federal
government’s fiscal position because
defense’s share of total federal spending
only rose from 23.2 percent in 1981 to
27.3 percent in 1988. Although defense
spending has been falling in real terms
ever since, we have yet to reach budget
balance because Congress has failed to
restrain overall spending levels even
despite such legislative efforts as the
Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act. In fact,
defense is virtually the only major cate-
gory of spending that has been cut—re-
peatedly—in real terms.
Entitlement Spending Grew Un-
controllably. There is truth here, 
as well. Social expenditures have out-
stripped inflation and grown every year.
For example, between 1996 and 1997,
while inflation was about 2.3 percent,
defense spending increased only 2 
percent. But during that time frame,
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Predicting Tax Collections After Rate Changes Is Never Easy
The total amount of revenue that any tax will generate (ignoring fraud and the 
costs of making the collection) can be summarized in a simple formula:
Tax revenues collected = (percentage tax rate) x (relevant tax base)
Tax revenues collected depends upon not one thing, but two. So setting tax rates and then
making accurate projections about how changing these rates will affect revenues is very
difficult.
In a static world in which the economic base remains unchanged as various rates are
applied to it, predicting tax revenue changes would be easy. But in the actual, dynamic
world in which people alter their economic behavior in response to a changing percentage
in the tax rate, the issue becomes a good deal more complex.
The disincentive effects of taxation must be considered. Economists know that when you
tax something, you will reduce its size. For example, if you increase the tax rate on the cre-
ation of wealth (the base in the equation), then wealth creation will be less than it otherwise
would have been without the tax rate increase. This disincentive effect can be offset some-
times by overall economic growth, which tends to occur in capitalist economies even when
they are saddled with increased tax rates. What makes predicting these tax effects so dif-
ficult is that both terms on the right-hand side of the equation always move in response to
any change on the left-hand side, but they may not move in the same direction. 
Given the tax equation above, it is obvious that economic downturns, which shrink the
economic base, will result in lower overall tax collections even at static (or possibly even
rising) tax rates, while steady economic growth (and inflation) can fill government coffers
without any tax rate increase at all. Since growth is normal for our economy, we expect (and
we typically observe) government tax collections to rise even at static rates of application.
But we do not necessarily observe an increase in revenues collected when tax rates are
legislatively raised.
The simple assumption that many people make is that a tax rate increase will always
produce a rise in revenues, while a tax rate cut will always produce a decline in revenues.
Evidence suggests that this view is simplistic and sometimes erroneous as illustrated in
Chart 6, which shows capital gains rate changes in 1981 and 1986 and the subsequent
revenues collected after those changes. The significant increase in revenues collected after
the rate cut in 1981 is matched by the equally stark decline in revenues collected after the
rate increase in 1986. In the former case, the base expanded fast enough to generate ris-
ing collections after the cut; in the latter, it shrank so that the tax hike produced less col-
lected revenue even after a decade had passed. Although forecast errors sometimes make
news, it is easy to see why they so often occur.
Chart 6
Taxes Paid on Capital Gains
Income, 1970–97
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SOURCE: Department of Treasury.spending on Social Security rose 4.4
percent and Medicare 5.8 percent. Be-
tween 1969 and 1996, Medicare expen-
ditures increased by 3,000 percent,
Medicaid by 4,000 percent and Social
Security by 1,300 percent. Overall en-
titlement spending rose 1,225 percent 
in the same period. Defense spending
rose 222 percent but fell from 8.7 per-
cent of GDP to 3.5 percent. Entitlement
spending rose from 6.8 percent of GDP
to 11.5 percent during the same period.
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It is hardly surprising that, as military
threats have seemed to recede, domes-
tic spending would take its place. Yet
the domestic spending growth rate is
significant, and the projected retirement
of the baby boomers could place in-
credible stress and strain on the Social
Security and Heath Insurance programs.
The budget agreement of 1997 does 
little to address the impending fiscal
shortfalls that are projected for those
programs. As Chairman Greenspan re-
cently told a Senate committee:
Unless Social Security savings are in-
creased by higher taxes (with negative
consequences for growth) or reduced
benefits, domestic savings must be
augmented by greater private saving
or surpluses in the rest of the govern-
ment budget to ensure that there are
enough overall savings to finance 
adequate productive capacity down
the road and to meet the consumption




It is possible that the long sequence
of federal budget deficits is finally com-
ing to an end, even though the deficit 
is predicted to rise from last year’s $23
billion to $58 billion this year. It is far
from clear, however, what is primarily
responsible for the predicted budget
balance after that. Evidence suggests
that stronger-than-predicted economic
growth, a booming stock market and
prior tax rate hikes are primarily re-
sponsible for the rapid increase in fed-
eral tax receipts that will, in turn, lead to
budget balance. Evidence also shows,
however, that the act of matching ex-
penditures with predicted revenues—
the budget process itself—has been a
major problem since 1969 and that
overestimation of deficits (Chart 7 ) has
been the major constraining factor on
congressional spending. If deficits result
from that process, then that process
needs to be changed. Regardless, three
important fiscal issues must be ad-
dressed as the nation enters the new
millennium: Do we want the current
high level of taxation to continue? Can
we simplify the federal tax code so that
average taxpayers do not run afoul of
its labyrinthian structure? And what are
we going to do about the projected 
Social Security deficit problem?
9 Just as
there are historic moments when “op-
portunistic disinflation” occurs and
monetary policy can more easily be
changed from then on, so this may be 
a moment of “opportunistic fiscal bal-
ance” from which we can enter the next
century in a fiscal position not seen in
three decades. The nation can profit 
immensely from this development, pro-




My thanks to Mike Cox and Jason Saving for useful suggestions and
comments, and to Dong Fu for patient and thorough research assis-
tance.
1 The huge annual borrowing required by the past 22 years’ budget
deficits has pushed the national debt from $366 billion in 1975 to
over $5.3 trillion today.
2 These projections are carried out by the CBO, which was created in
1975.
3 A nice overview of the complicated—and spending-biased—
budget process is in Insight, December 29, 1997.
4 Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1996. The
increase on the Health Insurance (Medicare/Medicaid) portion 
cannot be calculated in percentage terms due to the removal of the
income cap altogether.
5 Testimony before the House Budget Committee, October 8, 1997.
6 A detailed overview of the 1997 changes and how they might affect
average taxpayers can be found in Kathy Bergen’s “Taxpayers Face
Mind-Boggling Search for Choices Among a Maze of Tax Cuts,”
Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, December 1, 1997.
The best performing group of stocks in late 1997 has been tax
preparation companies, a sure signal that investors know the tax
code changes are complicated and that they will raise the revenues
of these firms.
7 Monthly Budget Review for 1997, CBO. 
8 Testimony before the Task Force on Social Security of the Commit-
tee on the Budget of the U.S. Senate, November 20, 1997. 
9 One potential solution was offered by Harvey Rosenblum in “Why
Social Security Should Be Privatized,” Southwest Economy, Issue 3,
1997.
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cial market explosions received
much press coverage, a full ex-
planation has not—and with
good reason. The economic lit-
erature involves long-standing
and ongoing debates about what really
determines sudden movements in asset
prices: fundamentals or unexplainable
“animal spirits.”
This article outlines the trajectory of
capital market turmoil as it moved from
Thailand in July to Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Hong Kong by 
October and then to Korea in Novem-
ber. As the contradictory elements of
the current literature on asset prices
suggest, there is plenty to wonder
about. Regardless of what triggered this
turmoil, one artifact it uncovered was
the insufficiency of Asian financial sys-
tems to maintain corporate governance.
Despite their own high savings rates,
many Asian countries received large in-
flows of foreign capital during the pre-
sent decade. According to some analysts,
low rates of return in Japan and, to
some extent, Europe motivated capital
to seek higher returns elsewhere.
Chart 1 depicts the rapidly rising
loan-to-GDP ratios of four Asian coun-
tries. The ratios are consistent with a
story one often hears about high levels
of lending: too much money chasing
too few good investments—or too many
bad ones. Large surges in lending do
seem to reduce bankers’ vigilance over
asset quality. In Asia, some of the in-
vestment booms began to be followed
by asset quality busts.
When suspicions of a banking crisis
materialize, who knows if there is really
a commitment to resolve the problems
quickly, and, if there is, how they will
be resolved. Will the government inflate
its way out of the difficulties? Will there
be fiscal problems? Questions like these
can make foreign investors nervous. In
late 1996 they started to pull their funds
from Thailand, the site of Asia’s first
1997 financial crisis.
As foreigners took their money out
of Thailand, they exchanged their Thai
currency (baht) for dollars or other non-
Thai currency, thereby lowering the de-
mand for baht and putting downward
pressure on the Thai exchange rate. To
hold the exchange rate within the band
established for it, the Thai central bank
began to spend its foreign currency re-
serves to purchase baht, which created
a demand that no longer existed in 
the private sector. To encourage foreign
capital to stay, the Thais also raised in-
terest rates. In July, seeing the ineffec-
tiveness of their efforts, the Thais let the
baht devalue.
Financial difficulties in Thailand may
have sensitized investors to other devel-
oping Asian markets and to the like-
lihood of other Asian devaluations.
Worries about mounting problem loans,
rising excess capacity and slow de-
mand, as well as concerns that these
problems would continue may have
been what motivated investors to move
their money out of Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines. However, the issues
of problem loans and excess capacity
appear not to have been consistent
across countries where capital outflows
occurred. The Philippines suffered
much exchange rate pressure, but 
with what appeared to be less struc-
tural foundation than Indonesia, for 
example. The results of the outflows,
however, were major devaluations for
all three countries from July—when
Thailand devalued—through October
(Chart  2).
By October the round of financial
problems and devaluations across south
Asia made some investors worry that
Hong Kong, one of the region’s impor-
tant bankers, might be ripe for the
same. Hong Kong real estate prices had
risen markedly over the past year
amidst one more of the various Asian
construction euphorias. Meanwhile, mar-
ket concerns were said to be accumu-
lating that the takeover by the People’s
Republic of China might ultimately
abridge the covenants that had made
Hong Kong so financially attractive.
Some investors believed that Hong
Kong might also suffer because its mar-
kets are highly integrated with those of
other Southeast Asian countries.
Because Hong Kong’s huge foreign
currency reserves allowed a strong 
defense of its dollar, the speculative
currency attacks were ultimately ineffec-
tive. But perhaps another reason for
their ineffectiveness was less evidence
of loan quality problems in Hong Kong
than in such markets as Thailand and
Indonesia. Nevertheless, the quality of
Hong Kong’s assets proved insufficient
to prevent a serious run on Hong Kong’s
securities market.
In November, the market began to
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tions between the nation’s large corpo-
rations, banks and the government had
resulted in lending for projects whose
principal contribution to Korea was 
industrial overcapacity. Government-
authorized bank liberalizations had
greatly eased access to foreign capital but
had not beefed up bank supervision to
avoid injudicious lending. The ongoing
weakness in Japan, softness among the
rest of Korea’s Asian customers, Korean
difficulties in identifying the extent of
short-term outstanding debt and a re-
luctance to resolve banking problems
initially contributed to much market un-
certainty, runs on currency and the se-
curities markets, and deep devaluation.
What’s Behind the Turmoil?
Although it is difficult to know why
all of the Asian financial markets went
into turmoil exactly when they did,
some possible reasons for their respec-
tive plunges have emerged.
Financial Inflexibility and State
Paternalism. Asian countries tend to
follow the Japanese model in which
banks, large corporations and govern-
ments operate in the same close rela-
tionship year after year. The discipline
of hostile takeovers, shareholder revolts
and bond vigilantes plays a far smaller
role in this environment, even though
the Asian countries do have securities
markets. New ideas and technology can
certainly make it through this “old boy”
network, but the flexibility that allows
the sudden rise and efficiencies of a
Dell or a Microsoft, or the equally sud-
den decline of a Commodore or Wang,
is much rarer in a region where govern-
ment decides what and who will grow.
Trade and Technology Advances.
The enormous increase in the impor-
tance of trade in most countries has
meant much greater competition and,
therefore, far more pressure for the
technology advances and cost improve-
ments we often get from those same 
little companies that rise so suddenly.
Since the corporate governance im-
posed by active stock and bond mar-
kets turns out to be particularly useful
in high-tech industries, these competi-
tive pressures may explain why an
Asian-style bank-centered financial sys-
tem that was very serviceable is now
less so.
Financial Liberalization and Weak
Supervision. In the 1990s, Asian coun-
tries began to allow banks and other
lenders much greater access to foreign
capital and to loosen the restrictions
that had made it hard for banks to 
attract deposits or to lend profitably.
These changes occurred in a world in
which financial markets were becoming
much more globalized anyway. The re-
sults were large increases in bank de-
posits and other liabilities, as well as a
rush of lending, but not enough finan-
cial supervision and regulation to keep
up with it. Similarly, a lack of trans-
parency in the equities markets meant
that when those markets got jittery, they
got very jittery indeed.
Pegged and Problematic Exchange
Rates. Asian countries typically pegged
their exchange rates. That is, they inter-
vened in the markets for their currency
so as to maintain exchange rates within
certain bounds. The result has been that
when pressure builds on an exchange
rate and a country finally stops defend-
ing it, the consequent exchange rate
plunge creates much uncertainty about
its future trajectory. It is not unusual for
an exchange rate, once it becomes
shaky, to remain shaky for a while.
While this pattern reflects uncertainty, it
also contributes to it.
Conclusion
There is in fact much that is known
about the Asian financial meltdown, up
to a point. Indeed, financial problems in
the Asian countries were heavily cov-
ered in the financial press well before
the turmoil began in July 1997. Never-
theless, much remains to be explained.
We don’t know fully why Hong Kong
suffered such market turmoil. Why did
the Philippines, lacking the banking
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problems and nontradable asset price
bubbles of Indonesia and Thailand, suf-
fer an exchange rate attack at about the
same time as those countries? Further-
more, the standard explanations do not
shed much light on timing. They tell us
little, for example, about why Korea’s 
financial turmoil occurred so much later
than Thailand’s.
Despite what actually sent Asia’s
1997 financial tumult in the peculiar 
sequence that it followed, it’s now clear
that an essential problem in these coun-
tries was inadequate corporate gover-
nance—the discipline financial markets
are supposed to impose on the issuers
of debt or equity when markets are 
efficient. In the Asian situation, neither
financial supervision and regulation nor
covenants established by the private
sector were effective in governing what
businesses did with what they bor-
rowed or in preventing certain busi-
nesses from receiving funding for shaky
projects. It is for this reason that in-
creased transparency of financial be-
havior and of financial instruments is
among the conditions of the bailout
lending programs for these countries,
where the results of nontransparency
now seem so clear.
—William C. Gruben
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on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet Web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
NDICATORS SUCH AS employment and unemployment
are useful measures of regional economic activity, but
output figures often give a more complete picture of a
region’s economy. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) estimates the output measure, real gross state
product (GSP)—the state equivalent of national real gross
domestic product (GDP). Unfortunately, because these esti-
mates are yearly and come out with a significant lag (the lat-
est year available is 1994), they are of little use to researchers
trying to gauge current economic conditions at the state level.
Frank Berger and Keith Phillips of the Dallas Fed have de-
vised a method to estimate Texas output that is both more fre-
quent and more timely. Using standard statistical techniques,
they examined the relationship between the yearly BEA out-
put numbers and other, more frequent indicators that might
move in step with GSP. Berger and Phillips found that in most
I
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI** Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
11/97 123.7 127.9 166.2 469.3 1,088.0 1,472.7 5,503.0 8,699.2 1,839.5 709.8
10/97 124.2 127.7 166.2 466.8 1,084.4 1,469.9 5,474.8 8,662.1 1,839.4 709.7
9/97 124.3 127.6 165.8 467.3 1,083.8 1,483.5 5,459.5 8,659.9 1,835.6 706.4
8/97 122.4 127.2 165.4 465.9 1,082.4 1,473.7 5,438.7 8,626.1 1,828.3 707.4
7/97 122.4 127.6 165.7 463.9 1,078.7 1,468.2 5,426.2 8,602.7 1,830.7 707.8
6/97 120.9 127.0 164.7 464.9 1,078.2 1,467.8 5,407.0 8,582.6 1,828.9 705.8
5/97 121.4 125.5 163.8 463.2 1,077.6 1,471.6 5,401.2 8,577.4 1,827.0 705.4
4/97 120.2 124.7 163.6 458.1 1,076.4 1,470.0 5,384.8 8,552.9 1,828.5 703.4
3/97 119.1 124.6 163.0 455.1 1,073.5 1,468.8 5,371.4 8,531.8 1,824.1 702.1
2/97 119.4 124.1 162.6 455.8 1,070.1 1,467.2 5,344.6 8,500.3 1,821.9 701.6
1/97 118.9 124.3 161.5 446.9 1,067.4 1,466.7 5,317.5 8,460.0 1,820.3 699.8
12/96 117.7 124.0 159.3 444.2 1,066.1 1,464.8 5,279.5 8,413.9 1,819.4 698.5
* in thousands
** Texas Industrial Production Index
industries, changes in nominal personal income and industry
price measures can account for most of the change in the real
output figures. Using this relationship, they were able to ac-
curately interpolate quarterly GSP figures within the yearly
data and then extrapolate more recent quarters.
According to these estimates, real output growth in Texas
accelerated during the first half of 1997, increasing at an 
annualized 7.6 percent and 6.9 percent rate in the first and
second quarters, respectively. This outpaced the United States
as a whole, as real GDP rose 4 percent and 3.4 percent over
the same time periods. The healthy U.S. economy and the
continued recovery in the Mexican economy have helped 
spur the rapid output growth in Texas. Strong activity in the
energy and construction sectors also contributed to the first-
half expansion.
—Justin Marion
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First Quarter ’98 Economic Headlines
The Dallas Fed’s first quarter ’98 Economic Review offers new in-
sight into three timely issues. Economic Review is a quarterly
journal that takes a policy-oriented approach to thought-provoking
economic issues. Free subscriptions and individual copies are
available on request by calling (800) 333-4460 or (214) 922-5254,
or by faxing (214) 922-5268.
Crude Oil and Gasoline Prices: An Asymmetric Relationship?
by Nathan S. Balke, Stephen P. A. Brown and Mine K. Yücel
Gasoline is the petroleum product whose price is always under
public scrutiny. Using several different model specifications, the
authors determine whether an asymmetric relationship exists
between gasoline and crude oil prices.
Has NAFTA Changed North American Trade? By David M. Gould
The author explores NAFTA’s effects on North America’s trading patterns since its implementation in
1994.
The Dynamic Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform, Part 1: The Basic Model by Evan F. Koenig and
Gregory W. Huffman
Economists describe a framework for analyzing how the adoption of a flat-rate consumption tax would
affect the U.S. economy over time.
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